Prospects for EU-India Security Cooperation

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Contents

Introduction: the scope for security cooperation between the EU and India

Samir Saran, Eva Pejsova, Gareth Price

There is a clear imperative for greater understanding between the EU and India on a range of security concerns. Until recently, this imperative has not been obvious. India's focus has been inward-looking, predicated on the need for rapid economic growth. However, since 2014, the BJP-led government in Delhi has demonstrated a much greater emphasis on foreign policy; in 2015 the foreign secretary, Dr. S Jaishankar, argued that ''India wants to be a leading power rather than just a balancing Power''. And while the EU has faced a range of difficulties in recent years – among them, economic challenges since the 2008 financial crisis, terror incidents across Europe, and a surge in refugee inflows – these have increased its focus on constructing both an outward- and forward-looking foreign policy.

The European Union and India have been engaged in a strategic partnership since 2004. The 13th Summit, held in March 2016, directly advocated advancing cooperation in the field of security. Counter-terrorism had been an element of EU-India engagement since the strategic partnership was agreed. Other thematic issues raised at the 2016 summit as subjects for dialogue and engagement included cyber-security, counter-piracy and non-proliferation. In terms of regional concerns, the EU and India stressed their shared concerns or interests regarding a number of countries or regions, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, North Korea, Iran and West Asia/the Middle East – in particular Syria.

Chatham House, the EU Institute for Security Studies, and the Observer Research Foundation held a closed-door workshop and a public conference on 'Prospects for EU-India Security Cooperation' in September 2016 exploring the scope for engagement on three of these issues: West Asia, maritime security, and counter-terrorism and radicalisation. The workshop discussed the potential contours of EU-India collaboration, as well as the hurdles to their enhanced engagement. Each of the issues is of paramount concern both to India and the EU, but each of these differ in terms of existing cooperation and the underlying interests. The degree of cooperation feasible will be contingent both on political will and capacity, but for each issue we established a range of potential options for collaboration, ranging from specific and granular opportunities for shared learning, to more aspirational dialogues seeking to establish shared frameworks for collaboration in dealing with such challenges.

West Asia has historically been a bridge connecting Europe with Asia. As their shared periphery, developments in the region – including conflict – have a severe effect on both the EU and India. Both rely on petro-chemical imports from the region; the EU is suffering from inflows of refugees escaping conflict; millions of Indians work in West Asia. The current economic downturn is affecting the livelihood of many Indians. And India has had to evacuate its own (and other South Asian) nationals from, inter alia, Yemen, Lebanon and Libya in recent years.

India's engagement with West Asia is self-evidently on an upward trend highlighted, for instance, by the recent decision to make the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi the guest of honour at India's 2017 Republic Day celebration. Yet neither the EU nor India conceive of each other as primary interlocutors in relation to West Asia. This may reflect both the geo-political reality and the staid policy approaches on both sides. The interests of the EU and India are more likely to be converging than currently framed and understood. Initiating dialogue now, to understand better the two sides' interests in West Asia, will pay dividends in the years to come when close collaboration will be inevitable.

There is significant scope for better cooperation on the issue of maritime security. The Indian Ocean is the venue for the EU's most successful military mission to date – EU NAVFOR or Operation Atalanta – coordinating anti-piracy operations off Somalia with a host of countries including India. EU engagement in the Indian Ocean also includes EUCAP Nestor, the financing of the Indian Ocean Commission and the EU-CRIMARIO project intended to improve maritime security in the entire region. At the very least, maritime security offers scope for enhanced dialogue; at the more aspirational level, the EU and India – sharing interests in maintaining open sea lanes of cooperation – could work together promoting the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as the basis of maritime governance. Further, while Operation Atalanta has proved successful thus far, piracy will remain a threat until the root causes – on land rather than at sea – have been tackled. Both sides have a palpable interest in stabilising Somalia and other fragile coastal geographies.

The emergence of piracy in the Western Indian Ocean has provided a unique opportunity for navies from within and outside the region to join forces in addressing a concrete security threat. There is a need to seize the momentum and build upon this positive experience to foster operational cooperation also in other maritime security domains or in combatting sea-borne crime such as smuggling and illegal unreported and unregulated fishing. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) is the primary multilateral forum promoting stability and rules-based conduct in the Indian Ocean. The experience, interests and presence of the EU in the Indian Ocean could make it a valuable dialogue partner of IORA.

Counter-terrorism has been a subject for EU-India discussion since the strategic partnership was forged. The joint declaration at the 2016 summit highlighted the determination of the EU and India to work together to tackle terrorism. Cooperation is extant in areas such as financing terrorism, designating groups as terrorist and working together in the UN system.

Yet there is scope to deepen cooperation. The EU is committed to helping India's Smart Cities initiative. This offers great scope to focus on resilience building – whether in relation to disasters or terrorist attacks. Radicalisation is another area in which the EU and India could work together. For the EU, domestic Islamic militancy is a relatively new phenomenon – until the attacks in Europe of 2004 and 2005, it had been seen as a foreign policy concern rather than an internal European problem. Despite having a Muslim population of more than 180 million, Indian Muslims have been relatively immune from radicalisation, certainly in contrast to European Muslim populations. Understanding the causes of this could offer insights to the EU. At the same time, there are growing incidents of radicalisation in India, though from a low base. Are there lessons from European understanding of the process of radicalisation – notably online radicalisation – for India? Existing cooperation on cyber-security could feed into this shared understanding. Countering violent extremism online will remain a common challenge for all liberal societies and working together to share, learn, and discover technologies and methods to respond to this contemporary threat must be part of the agenda.

The EU and India are only now beginning to appreciate the importance of the other, when engaging with global security challenges. The EU brings a range of experiences to the table that are relevant for India. The EU recognises that today's security challenges require a full spectrum approach – pure military solutions rarely work. The EU played a pivotal role in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. And while India and the EU may approach issues – such as the challenges facing West Asia – from different standpoints, initiating dialogues and conversations to better understand these different perspectives now will prove beneficial, as India's global role becomes more apparent.

Recommendations

West Asia

- The EU and India have clear-cut complementarities in regard to peace-keeping operations, under the auspices of the United Nations. There is scope for engagement both at a Track 1.5 and a Track 2 level, to explore concrete options for collaboration.
- India has proven highly competent in evacuating its own and third-country nationals from West Asia. The EU and India should establish an official level working group to share best practices on evacuation and explore avenues for a cohesive approach.
- The EU and India should initiate an annual Track 2 dialogue to deepen understanding of synergies and divergences in their interests and approaches, and suggest common solutions to mitigate and manage the conflicts in West Asia.
- Other potential areas for greater collaboration would be the development of energy infrastructure projects, greater coordination with respect to the developments in Afghanistan (where both the EU and India have similar objectives), and third-party mediation, for instance between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Maritime security

- The EU and India should establish a regular high-level, official dialogue on maritime security within the Strategic Partnership to build trust and explore avenues for further cooperation. This could include Search and Rescue/Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (SAR/HADR) operations, tackling sea-borne crime such as smuggling or illegal fishing, and potentially joint maritime or evacuation exercises.
- To improve maritime security in the Indian Ocean, the EU and India should cooperate on promoting Maritime Situational Awareness – building human and technological capacity on information sharing, maritime surveillance, search and rescue missions, and data collection – bilaterally, as well as with other countries of the Indian Ocean rim.
- There is a need for a comprehensive, multilateral maritime security and governance regime for the Indian Ocean. Existing regional organisation, with IORA at the forefront, should include discussions on maritime security in view of building such a regime in the future. Given its experience, sustained interest, presence, and involvement in the Indian Ocean, the EU could become a valuable Dialogue Partner of IORA.
- There is scope for enhanced joint scientific research on maritime issues, potentially under the remit of the EU's Blue Growth initiative; a long-term strategy to support sustainable growth in the marine and maritime sectors.

Counter-terrorism and radicalisation

- The EU and India have agreed to share experiences of their response to terrorist attacks. Under its support for India's 'Smart Cities' initiative, building urban resilience to terrorist attacks and other disasters, should be a primary objective.
- There is scope for enhanced understanding of why India has proven to be relatively immune from radicalisation. In addition, there is scope for the EU to engage with India on its learnings regarding the causes of radicalisation. In particular, online radicalisation is a growing challenge, and India's fast-growing number of smartphone users provides cause for concern; India has the third highest number of Internet users in the world. Similarly, there is scope for greater understanding and collaboration between the EU and Indian approach towards countering violent extremism.
- The EU and India should launch a dialogue to discuss approaches to rogue states, and terrorist groups and individuals. EU and India must develop a shared understanding and basis for identifying such 'states', the process and basis for sanctioning them and thereafter measuring the effectiveness of targeted sanctions.
- There is scope for greater functional cooperation: this could involve developing common situational awareness and identification of terrorist groups and coordinating measures aimed at preventing terror financing and the movement of terrorists. Furthermore there is at the minimum, potential for the exchange of best practices including those pertaining to deployment of new technology and tools.

Maritime Security

Eva Pejsova and John-Joseph Wilkins

Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014, maritime security – primarily focused on the Indian Ocean – has become a key element of India's domestic and foreign policies. The need to build a 'blue economy', as well as strengthening ties with neighbouring countries and smaller Indian Ocean nations in order to safeguard New Delhi's maritime interests has become a top priority.

Despite its enormous economic and strategic importance, the third-largest ocean in the world remains largely ungoverned. There is only limited cooperation in functional maritime security domains among countries of the Ocean's rim, and multilateral institutional structures remain weak. The spread of piracy off the Horn of Africa has demonstrated the fragility of the security situation in the Indian Ocean, attracting the interest and involvement of all major global players. On one hand, counter-piracy efforts have been successful and provided a great opportunity for navies to foster international cooperation. On the other hand, the increased military presence of foreign powers in the region, especially China, managed to gradually transform the Indian Ocean into the next arena of big power strategic competition.

Although New Delhi is striving to assert its primacy in its maritime neighbourhood, it cannot provide for the theatre's security and everyday management without the assistance of other partners with an established presence and lasting interest in the region. The European Union (EU) is one such partner, which has invested heavily in maritime security in the western Indian Ocean by building the capacity of local maritime agencies and enhancing maritime situational awareness to counter piracy, as well as other transnational security threats. It is also the area in which the EU has deployed one of its arguably most successful and robust military operations to date, the European Union Naval Force Operation (EUNAVFOR) Atalanta.

The EU's determination to sustain its presence and enhance security ties with other stakeholders in and across the Indian Ocean is also evident in its 2016 Global Strategy, as well as in its 'Strategy on China' – identifying antipiracy efforts and Africa as the most prospective areas of cooperation.[39] If EU has a strategy for China, India should not allow itself to be left behind. Thus, when debating how to revitalise the EU-India Strategic Partnership, in place since 2004, strengthening functional maritime security cooperation and building a comprehensive multilateral security regime in the Indian Ocean is therefore one of the most logical starting points.

India's Ocean?

India's renewed interest in maritime security is understandable and welcome. India is surrounded by – and vitally dependent on – maritime traffic and trade: at the end of last year, 90 percent of its foreign trade by volume and 77 percent in terms of value was seaborne.[40] India's coastal waters are also invaluable to domestic economic activity, providing important sources of income, as well as food. Strategically, the new maritime focus is well in line with India's effort to assert its position as a global power and a net security provider in its neighbourhood and beyond. There is also an important counter-terrorism and direct national security element: the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks infiltrated Indian territory in a dinghy via the Arabian Sea, and major structural reforms have seen maritime assets increase their role in ensuring secure borders. Last but certainly not least, India is driven by the increased military activity of China in its immediate neighbourhood, fuelling a big power competition dynamic.

Historically, India has often been accused of 'sea blindness': until the end of the Cold War, its security interests were mainly focused on its western land borders. Its (in many ways justified) preoccupation with shoring up its defences against Pakistan and China meant that the maritime realm was largely neglected. New Delhi's 'blue water' ambitions were first outlined in its 2007 Maritime Security Strategy, after which it acquired a number of capabilities, including amphibious surface ships and nuclear-powered submarines. With the acquisition of the *Vikramaditya* aircraft carrier from Russia, India is now the only power in Asia (apart from the US) in possession of two such landing platforms. In 2013, it also launched its first indigenous naval communication satellite, which further enhanced its capacity to monitor the entire Indian Ocean.

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39 "Joint Communication to the European Parliament and The Council: Elements for a new EU strategy on China", High Representative of The Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, European Commission, June 22, 2016, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/joint_communication_to_the_european_parliament_and_the_council_-_elements_for_a_new_eu_strategy_on_china.pdf

40 "India's New Maritime Strategy", IISS, Strategic Comments, December 1, 2015, https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments/sections/2015-1f4d/india-navy-65a1

Without doubt, China's increased interest in the Indian Ocean is one of the greatest drivers of India's efforts to (re)gain control over what it considers its 'backyard'. Suspicions about Beijing's regional ambitions date back to when China started negotiating the use of – and investing into – port facilities across the Indian Ocean, in what would be called the 'string of pearls' theory. The launch of the new Maritime Silk Route, China's ambitious trade and infrastructure project, is likely to further boost China's economic influence and strengthen its relations with those countries in which it invested. Finally, Beijing's announcement in February 2016 that it has begun the construction of a naval base in Djibouti, which will be the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) first-ever permanent military base overseas, can be seen as a strategic game-changer, especially given China's growing interests in East Africa.[41]

India has not stood idly by. In 2012, New Delhi expanded its naval presence on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal. The islands constitute a strategic outpost for controlling the Western side of the Malacca Straits bottleneck, and facilitating its engagement with South-East Asian navies, including the deployment in the South China Sea, where it is becoming increasingly involved. The repeated references to the 'Indo-Pacific' in India's new *Maritime Security Strategy* (published in October 2015) reflects a

Big Power Presence in the Indian Ocean

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41   Eva Pejsova, "Scrambling for the Indian Ocean", EUISS Brief Issue, February, 2016, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_4_Indian_Ocean.pdf

shift in its geostrategic vision in which New Delhi not only wants to 'look' but also 'act East'.[42]

The new eastward focus was also visible in the 2016 International Fleet Review (IFR), a series of events including an international military exercise, a prestigious parade and a set of conferences, which was held at the headquarters of the Eastern Naval Fleet Command of Visakhapatnam. The exercise, which brought together navies from over 50 countries under the theme 'United through Oceans', aimed at promoting trust and cooperation among neighbouring navies. However, it was also an opportunity to demonstrate India's new operational capabilities and assets, to underline its newfound maritime might and determination to set the rules in the Indian Ocean.

Increasing Maritime Connections

India's new maritime orientation has become an important driver for strengthening (security) relationships with its neighbours, both big and small. A number of reciprocal state visits have seen the Maldives once again warm to India following the archipelago nation's growing closeness with China and a spat over its authoritarian tendencies. Security concerns about radicalisation and terrorism (in particular the spread of extreme Islamist views) seem to have brought the two partners back together, as was indicated in a recent visit to New Delhi by the foreign minister of the Maldives.[43] In a similar vein, Sri Lanka had for some time been drifting out of New Delhi's orbit and growing close to Beijing. With the defeat of Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa and some energetic diplomacy on the part of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, however, it appears that India was able to 'snatch back this pearl from Beijing's string'.[44] This allowed for the hope that the Trilateral Maritime Security Co-operation Initiative – launched by India in October 2011 together with Sri Lanka and the Maldives – could be resuscitated from its current hiatus.

India has also made significant efforts to reach out to the smaller island states in the southwest of the Indian Ocean. Shuttle diplomacy tours conducted by Modi have been accompanied by the cementing of political ties and even gifts, creating a 'string of flowers' to boost its strategic foothold in the area. India has gifted an interceptor coastguard boat to the Seychelles, and the first India-manufactured warship built for export was launched

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42 Premesha Saha, "'Indo-Pacific': Evolving Perceptions and Dynamics", National Maritime Foundation, October 2015, http://www.maritimeindia.org/View%20Profile/Maritime%20Perspective%2015.pdf

43 Ankit Panda, "Foreign Ministers of India, Maldives Discuss Indian Ocean Security", The Diplomat, August 17, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/foreign-ministers-of-india-maldives-discuss-indian-ocean-security/

44 Kadira Pethiyagoda, "India v. China in Sri Lanka—Lessons for rising powers", Brookings Institution, May 1, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/05/01/india-v-china-in-sri-lanka-lessons-for-rising-powers/

in Mauritius in March 2015.[45] Now there are eight coastal surveillance radar systems in both the Seychelles and in Mauritius respectively, six in Sri Lanka and 10 in the Maldives, all of which transmit information to 51 Indian coastal sites and are collected and analysed by the newly created Information Management and Analysis Centre in New Delhi.[46]

Improving relations with East African countries on the Indian Ocean constitutes an important element of India's South-South cooperation – particularly in light of India's interest in garnering African support for its demand to reform the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Bilateral trade with these countries has also increased significantly over the last five years, with African and Indian annual export growth averaging 10 percent and 14 percent respectively.[47] Yet at the third India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), held in New Delhi in October 2015, Modi stressed India's commitment beyond trade and announced a grant assistance of $600 million– which includes a $100-million India-Africa development fund and an India-Africa health fund of $10 million. India has provided maritime military assistance to coastal trade partners like South Africa, Kenya and Tanzania. These are also the countries on the African mainland with the largest Indian diaspora communities and are the principal recipients of Indian investments.

Further to its east, India's interest in playing a more active security role in East Asia has been warmly welcomed by its strategic partners – it holds regular joint naval exercises (*Malabar*) with the US and Japan, and once more with Australia since 2015 – as well as ASEAN countries. The Indian Navy has also been involved in numerous operations in the Indian Ocean, from Search and Rescue (SAR) efforts of the 'disappeared' Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 in the Bay of Bengal to evacuation of Indian nationals from crisis zones such as Yemen (Operation Rahat).[48] India has also made use of maritime resources to deliver disaster aid to neighbouring countries, following, for example, the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, and to the Maldives during a water crisis in December 2004 (in which India provided 1,200 tons of fresh water to Male).[49]

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45 Ankit Panda, "India and Seychelles Strengthen Ties Around Maritime Security, Economic Cooperation", The Diplomat, August 31, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/india-and-seychelles-strengthen-ties-around-maritime-security-economic-cooperation/

46 "India's New Maritime Strategy", IISS, Strategic Comments, December 1, 2015, https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments/sections/2015-1f4d/india-navy-65a1

47 José Luengo-Cabrera, "Chindia in Africa", EUISS Brief Issue, April, 2016, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_12_Asia_in_Africa.pdf

48 Gurpreet S Khurana, "India's Yemen Evacuation: An Evolving Doctrine", National Maritime Foundation, May 21, 2015, http://www.maritimeindia.org/CommentryView.aspx?NMFCID=8503

49 Kapil Narula, "Drinking Water Crisis in Maldives: India Leads the Way", National Maritime Foundation, January 6, 2015, http://www.maritimeindia.org/CommentryView.aspx?NMFCID=5378

The Need for Maritime Multilateralism

Despite this proliferation of largely bilateral deals, the Indian Ocean still needs a sustainable, inclusive international regime for the management of its growing security challenges. Bordering a number of fragile (or even failed) states, its waters are plagued by transnational crime – from drug, weapons and people smuggling, to illegal unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU). The ocean's island states, such as the Maldives and the Seychelles, are also particularly vulnerable to marine environmental degradation, and the effects of climate change. The rising sea level is putting pressure on their already scarce freshwaters reserves and pushing people inland, and will possibly generate a wave of climate refugees in the long term. Finally, with the increased military presence and competition between big powers, there will soon be a need to establish a formal security regime with a crisis prevention mechanism to diffuse potential tensions or avoid accidental clashes.

Despite India's rhetoric on the need for multilateral maritime cooperation, the Indian Ocean lacks the adequate institutional structures, political will as well as the necessary trust required to bring this about. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the only formal regional organisation, is paralysed by the longstanding tensions between India and Pakistan, and in maritime terms only discusses elementary legislation on trade and fisheries. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the largest regional organisation bringing together 21 countries, increasingly discusses the need for maritime cooperation and building a 'blue economy', but geopolitical competition and a lack of resources are hampering any practical implementation. Finally, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), a Track 1.5 mechanism launched in 2008, is the latest example of India's effort to promote maritime cooperation and confidence-building in the region.

While such multilateral efforts are welcome, their effectiveness in reducing regional tensions or implementing functional security measures remains limited. This is mainly due to major discrepancies in size and level of economic development, political and strategic divergences among parties, as well as the presence of extra-regional powers. Furthermore, an understanding of the concepts of regional cooperation and multilateralism are often lacking due to the absence of common historical identity.[50]

Paradoxically, the final stumbling block in building a comprehensive multilateral maritime regime in the Indian Ocean seems to be India itself. While it is trying to promote maritime cooperation, it is also less willing to engage in initiatives that may weaken its dominant position.

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50 Eva Pejsova, "Scrambling for the Indian Ocean", EUISS Brief Issue, February, 2016, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_4_Indian_Ocean.pdf

Potential Areas for EU-India Cooperation

The Indian Ocean constitutes one of the most natural bases for the EU and India to build and expand their bilateral security cooperation. The EU has been actively involved in the ocean's western flank since it launched its counter-piracy operations in 2008. Since then, significant financial and human resources have been deployed by EU institutions and member states to enhance maritime security and safety in the region. Between July 2012 and October 2015, the EU civilian mission EUCAP Nestor aimed to enhance the maritime capacities (including counter-piracy and maritime governance) of five countries in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Seychelles and Tanzania).[51] Though its activities are now limited only to Somalia and its mandate is due to expire at the end of 2016, it showcases the EU's commitment to broader regional initiatives focused on maritime matters.

The EU has been investing in training, enhancing national legislation, information-sharing and maritime domain awareness through its Critical Maritime Routes Programme (CMR). Specifically, the EU supported the implementation of the IMO Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCOC), signed by 21 coastal states on the Western Indian Ocean rim, by facilitating the creation of three information-sharing centres in Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen, as well as of a Regional Maritime Training Centre in Djibouti. The EU Maritime Security (MASE)

Combating Piracy in the Indian Ocean

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51 Thierry Tardy, "CSDP in action: What contribution to international security?", EUISS Chaillot Paper, May 2015, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Chaillot_134_CSDP_missions.pdf

Programme, launched in 2013 with a budget of €37.5 million, ensures coordination and continuity between its various capacity-building projects in the Indian Ocean – including its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, law enforcement (CRIMLEA) and inland economic development and governance projects. The EU also provides 80 percent of the budget (over €80 million) of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), a body which builds capacity in regional fisheries management, small island state development and marine biodiversity protection.

With the rise of piracy and its threat to Indian sailors, India joined the anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and became a founding member of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, a voluntary, *ad hoc* international forum. The 2016 EU-India Agenda for Action, a roadmap to guide their strategic partnership for the next five years, specifically mentions the need to promote 'maritime security [and] freedom of navigation in accordance with international law', both of which were areas already identified in the EU-India Joint Action Plans of 2005 and 2008.[52] In the Joint Statement of the latest EU-India Summit of March 2016, both parties explicitly welcomed the 'efforts by the Contact Group on piracy off the coast of Somalia, chaired by the EU in 2014-2015'.[53] Outside of the Indian Ocean, given India's growing energy and commercial interests in West Africa, the Indian Navy has also pledged its commitment to help states in the Gulf of Guinea to protect maritime trade routes by offering patrolling assets and remote surveillance systems. This region, also a priority area for the EU, may also provide a testing ground for further EU-India cooperation in maritime affairs. The positive momentum, originally generated by the shared need to tackle piracy, can and should be harnessed to expand cooperation in other operational areas of maritime security.

Beyond the operational benefits, enhanced EU-India maritime security cooperation has also a broader political and strategic dimension. Although the EU and India have been 'Strategic Partners' for more than 10 years, relations have largely remained stalled and very little progress has been made in terms of security cooperation. The ongoing diplomatic standoff between Italy and India over the *Enrica Lexie* case does not help matters, especially in the field of maritime security. However, the problems run deeper, and are largely attributable to differences in security cultures, threat perceptions, as well as an underlying lack of strategic trust. The Indian leadership tends to view maritime security in purely conventional terms and barely acknowledges the EU as a potential partner in security matters (or sometimes even as a political entity in its own right) that could support New Delhi's national strategic interests. While Europe is fully aware of India's pressing traditional security concerns in its neighbourhood, it has become globally

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52   "EU-India Agenda for Action-2020", EU-India Summit, March 30, 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2016/03/20160330-agenda-action-eu-india_pdf/

53   "Joint Statement", 13th EU-India Summit, March 30, 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2016/03/20160330-joint-statement-eu-india_pdf/

acknowledged as a defender of a rules-based international order – a quality especially needed today, and not only at sea.

The recently released EU Global Strategy, entitled 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe', produced to guide EU foreign policy and makes it clear that maritime security is paramount: "The EU will contribute to global maritime security, building on its experience in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, and exploring possibilities in the Gulf of Guinea, the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca."[54] A landmark document, detailing Brussels's maritime ambitions, has been the 2014 EU Maritime Security Strategy.[55] The comprehensive 15-page document highlights the complexity and interconnectedness of the global maritime domain, as well as its multifaceted strategic, economic, environmental and scientific importance. Recognising the value of international cooperation, it promotes the strengthening of ties with other countries and regional blocks. The document is useful for institutionalising multilateral cooperation at sea, as it provides an overarching political and legal framework for states to deepen and rationalise cooperation in functional maritime security issues, which could be of interest to any regional grouping.

If New Delhi wishes to ensure long-term stability in the Indian Ocean, it will also have to look into the everyday technical problems related to its governance, something for which the EU can be an invaluable partner. For instance, a regular High-level Dialogue on Maritime Security within the Strategic Partnership could be established to build trust and explore avenues for further cooperation. This could include SAR and HADR (Humanitarian and Disaster Relief) operations, tackling sea-borne crime such as smuggling or IUU activities, as well as issues related to marine environmental degradation, joint resource development or marine scientific research. In the short term, the EU and India could work together to promote Maritime Situational Awareness – building human and technological capacity on information sharing, maritime surveillance and data collection. In the long term, regular exchanges and greater cooperation between the two strategic partners on maritime issues could progressively raise awareness, build trust, and enhance the capacities needed to establish a comprehensive multilateral maritime security regime for the Indian Ocean.

54   "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe", A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union

55   "European Union Maritime Security Strategy", Council of the European Union, June 2014, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202014%20INIT

EU-India declarations on counter-terrorism

September 2005: Political Declaration on the India-EU Strategic Partnership

We recognize the fact that terrorism constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, and reaffirm our condemnation of all acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations as criminal and unjustifiable, irrespective of their motives. As part of our joint efforts to fight terrorism, we will establish contacts between the Indian and EU Counter Terrorism Coordinators, work towards blocking access to terrorist financing and co-operate in the fight against money laundering.

Source: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/86132.pdf

December 2010: EU-India Joint Declaration on International Terrorism

Political dialogue:
- Continue to discuss Counter Terrorism cooperation at high level meetings within our security dialogue.
- Encourage all countries to deny safe haven to terrorists and to dismantle terror infrastructure on the territories under their control.

Law enforcement and police cooperation:
- Identify, including through seminars, areas of cooperation with respect to the designated agencies, according to their respective competencies.
- Continue efforts to prevent access by terrorists to financial and other resources.
- Enhance efforts for accessing and sharing strategic information, so as to better disrupt

and prevent terrorist activity.

- Intensify efforts to render the widest possible measure of mutual legal assistance and to expedite processing of extradition requests and to explore the possibility of an EU-India Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement and an EU-India Agreement on Extradition.

Research, Technology and Cybersecurity:
- Agree to closer India-EU cooperation and mutual assistance in this area.

Transport, aviation and border security:
- Work together in ICAO, to improve international security standards for passengers, cargo and mail, including in transit.
- Coordinate efforts against terrorists and terrorist groups so as to deny them safe haven and freedom of travel in accordance with international law.
- Encourage more efficient controls on issuance of identity and travel documents to prevent movement of terrorist and terrorist groups across national borders.

Consequence Management:
- Share experiences and best practices on managing the consequences of a terrorist attack.

Cooperation in the Multilateral system, including United Nations:
- Increase cooperation in multilateral fora like the UN, and intensify efforts to bring about a rapid adoption of CCIT.
- Build on the opportunities of coordination provided by the membership of Financial Action Task Force of EU Member States and India by intensifying efforts to prevent access by terrorists to financial and other resources and by sharing best practices on financial controls.
- Reaffirm commitment to implement the 2006 UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy as a unique instrument to enhance national, regional and global efforts to counter terrorism.
- Encourage global ratification and effective implementation of all relevant conventions on counter terrorism.
- Promote initiatives, under the auspices of UN, inter alia, on Alliance of Civilization initiative, to enhance dialogue and broaden understanding among civilizations.
- The EU and India agree that an effective and comprehensive approach to diminish the long term threat of violent extremism is an important component of our efforts to combat terrorism.

Source: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/118405.pdf

30 March 2016: India-EU Joint Declaration on the Fight Against Terrorism

Recalling the 'India-EU Joint Declaration on International Terrorism' of 2010, the Leaders noted the urgent need for a comprehensive approach to address terrorism. They resolved to step up cooperation to prevent and counter violent extremism and radicalisation, disrupt recruitment, terrorist movements and the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, stop sources of terrorist financing, dismantle terrorist infrastructure and prevent supply of arms to terrorists. To this end, they committed to further enhance exchanges in the fields of finance, justice and police and looked forward to the EU-India Counter-terrorism Dialogue.

Reaffirming that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group, India and the EU agreed to coordinate efforts to prevent violent extremism also by addressing conditions conducive to its spread. The Leaders expressed concern at the increased incidence of radicalisation of youth and the use of the internet to this end. They emphasised the need to develop bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the field of information and communication technology, including IT service providers to minimise the use of cyber space for by terrorist groups and to counter extremist narratives online. They agreed that cooperation between immigration and airline authorities for monitoring travel of foreign terrorist fighters requires urgent collective action by all nations.

Source: http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26576/IndiaEU_Joint_Statement_on_the_13th_IndiaEU_Summit_Brussels

Biographies

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Samir Saran is Vice President of the Observer Research Foundation. Samir spearheads ORF's outreach and business development activities. He is a frequent commentator on issues of Global Governance, including climate change and energy policy, global development, architecture, cyber security and internet governance, and India's foreign policy. Apart from his academic publications, Samir features regularly in Indian and international print and broadcast media. His latest published work includes, "India's Contemporary Plurilateralism" in the Oxford University Press Handbook on India's Foreign Policy; "New Room to Manoeuvre: An Indian Approach to Climate Change", a Global Policy–ORF publication; "Attitudes to Water in South Asia," a joint ORF–Chatham House Report; "A Long Term Vision for BRICS," a comprehensive vision document submitted to the BRICS Think Tanks Council; "The ITU and Unbundling Internet Governance: An Indian Perspective," for the Council on Foreign Relations; a joint research project between ORF and the Heritage Foundation, "Indo–US Cooperation on Internet Governance and Cyber Security;" and a paper on "The Shifting Digital Pivot: Time for Smart Multilateralism" for Digital Debates. He is the Indian Chair for the Civil BRICS Initiative, and also chairs CyFy, the India conference on cyber security and internet governance.

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
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