Prospects for EU-India Security Cooperation

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Contents

Introduction: the scope for security cooperation between the EU and India

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There is a clear imperative for greater understanding between the EU and India on a range of security concerns. Until recently, this imperative has not been obvious. India's focus has been inward-looking, predicated on the need for rapid economic growth. However, since 2014, the BJP-led government in Delhi has demonstrated a much greater emphasis on foreign policy; in 2015 the foreign secretary, Dr. S Jaishankar, argued that ''India wants to be a leading power rather than just a balancing Power''. And while the EU has faced a range of difficulties in recent years – among them, economic challenges since the 2008 financial crisis, terror incidents across Europe, and a surge in refugee inflows – these have increased its focus on constructing both an outward- and forward-looking foreign policy.

The European Union and India have been engaged in a strategic partnership since 2004. The 13th Summit, held in March 2016, directly advocated advancing cooperation in the field of security. Counter-terrorism had been an element of EU-India engagement since the strategic partnership was agreed. Other thematic issues raised at the 2016 summit as subjects for dialogue and engagement included cyber-security, counter-piracy and non-proliferation. In terms of regional concerns, the EU and India stressed their shared concerns or interests regarding a number of countries or regions, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, North Korea, Iran and West Asia/the Middle East – in particular Syria.

Chatham House, the EU Institute for Security Studies, and the Observer Research Foundation held a closed-door workshop and a public conference on 'Prospects for EU-India Security Cooperation' in September 2016 exploring the scope for engagement on three of these issues: West Asia, maritime security, and counter-terrorism and radicalisation. The workshop discussed the potential contours of EU-India collaboration, as well as the hurdles to their enhanced engagement. Each of the issues is of paramount concern both to India and the EU, but each of these differ in terms of existing cooperation and the underlying interests. The degree of cooperation feasible will be contingent both on political will and capacity, but for each issue we established a range of potential options for collaboration, ranging from specific and granular opportunities for shared learning, to more aspirational dialogues seeking to establish shared frameworks for collaboration in dealing with such challenges.

West Asia has historically been a bridge connecting Europe with Asia. As their shared periphery, developments in the region – including conflict – have a severe effect on both the EU and India. Both rely on petro-chemical imports from the region; the EU is suffering from inflows of refugees escaping conflict; millions of Indians work in West Asia. The current economic downturn is affecting the livelihood of many Indians. And India has had to evacuate its own (and other South Asian) nationals from, inter alia, Yemen, Lebanon and Libya in recent years.

India's engagement with West Asia is self-evidently on an upward trend highlighted, for instance, by the recent decision to make the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi the guest of honour at India's 2017 Republic Day celebration. Yet neither the EU nor India conceive of each other as primary interlocutors in relation to West Asia. This may reflect both the geo-political reality and the staid policy approaches on both sides. The interests of the EU and India are more likely to be converging than currently framed and understood. Initiating dialogue now, to understand better the two sides' interests in West Asia, will pay dividends in the years to come when close collaboration will be inevitable.

There is significant scope for better cooperation on the issue of maritime security. The Indian Ocean is the venue for the EU's most successful military mission to date – EU NAVFOR or Operation Atalanta – coordinating anti-piracy operations off Somalia with a host of countries including India. EU engagement in the Indian Ocean also includes EUCAP Nestor, the financing of the Indian Ocean Commission and the EU-CRIMARIO project intended to improve maritime security in the entire region. At the very least, maritime security offers scope for enhanced dialogue; at the more aspirational level, the EU and India – sharing interests in maintaining open sea lanes of cooperation – could work together promoting the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as the basis of maritime governance. Further, while Operation Atalanta has proved successful thus far, piracy will remain a threat until the root causes – on land rather than at sea – have been tackled. Both sides have a palpable interest in stabilising Somalia and other fragile coastal geographies.

The emergence of piracy in the Western Indian Ocean has provided a unique opportunity for navies from within and outside the region to join forces in addressing a concrete security threat. There is a need to seize the momentum and build upon this positive experience to foster operational cooperation also in other maritime security domains or in combatting sea-borne crime such as smuggling and illegal unreported and unregulated fishing. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) is the primary multilateral forum promoting stability and rules-based conduct in the Indian Ocean. The experience, interests and presence of the EU in the Indian Ocean could make it a valuable dialogue partner of IORA.

Counter-terrorism has been a subject for EU-India discussion since the strategic partnership was forged. The joint declaration at the 2016 summit highlighted the determination of the EU and India to work together to tackle terrorism. Cooperation is extant in areas such as financing terrorism, designating groups as terrorist and working together in the UN system.

Yet there is scope to deepen cooperation. The EU is committed to helping India's Smart Cities initiative. This offers great scope to focus on resilience building – whether in relation to disasters or terrorist attacks. Radicalisation is another area in which the EU and India could work together. For the EU, domestic Islamic militancy is a relatively new phenomenon – until the attacks in Europe of 2004 and 2005, it had been seen as a foreign policy concern rather than an internal European problem. Despite having a Muslim population of more than 180 million, Indian Muslims have been relatively immune from radicalisation, certainly in contrast to European Muslim populations. Understanding the causes of this could offer insights to the EU. At the same time, there are growing incidents of radicalisation in India, though from a low base. Are there lessons from European understanding of the process of radicalisation – notably online radicalisation – for India? Existing cooperation on cyber-security could feed into this shared understanding. Countering violent extremism online will remain a common challenge for all liberal societies and working together to share, learn, and discover technologies and methods to respond to this contemporary threat must be part of the agenda.

The EU and India are only now beginning to appreciate the importance of the other, when engaging with global security challenges. The EU brings a range of experiences to the table that are relevant for India. The EU recognises that today's security challenges require a full spectrum approach – pure military solutions rarely work. The EU played a pivotal role in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. And while India and the EU may approach issues – such as the challenges facing West Asia – from different standpoints, initiating dialogues and conversations to better understand these different perspectives now will prove beneficial, as India's global role becomes more apparent.

Recommendations

West Asia

- The EU and India have clear-cut complementarities in regard to peace-keeping operations, under the auspices of the United Nations. There is scope for engagement both at a Track 1.5 and a Track 2 level, to explore concrete options for collaboration.
- India has proven highly competent in evacuating its own and third-country nationals from West Asia. The EU and India should establish an official level working group to share best practices on evacuation and explore avenues for a cohesive approach.
- The EU and India should initiate an annual Track 2 dialogue to deepen understanding of synergies and divergences in their interests and approaches, and suggest common solutions to mitigate and manage the conflicts in West Asia.
- Other potential areas for greater collaboration would be the development of energy infrastructure projects, greater coordination with respect to the developments in Afghanistan (where both the EU and India have similar objectives), and third-party mediation, for instance between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Maritime security

- The EU and India should establish a regular high-level, official dialogue on maritime security within the Strategic Partnership to build trust and explore avenues for further cooperation. This could include Search and Rescue/Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (SAR/HADR) operations, tackling sea-borne crime such as smuggling or illegal fishing, and potentially joint maritime or evacuation exercises.
- To improve maritime security in the Indian Ocean, the EU and India should cooperate on promoting Maritime Situational Awareness – building human and technological capacity on information sharing, maritime surveillance, search and rescue missions, and data collection – bilaterally, as well as with other countries of the Indian Ocean rim.
- There is a need for a comprehensive, multilateral maritime security and governance regime for the Indian Ocean. Existing regional organisation, with IORA at the forefront, should include discussions on maritime security in view of building such a regime in the future. Given its experience, sustained interest, presence, and involvement in the Indian Ocean, the EU could become a valuable Dialogue Partner of IORA.
- There is scope for enhanced joint scientific research on maritime issues, potentially under the remit of the EU's Blue Growth initiative; a long-term strategy to support sustainable growth in the marine and maritime sectors.

Counter-terrorism and radicalisation

- The EU and India have agreed to share experiences of their response to terrorist attacks. Under its support for India's 'Smart Cities' initiative, building urban resilience to terrorist attacks and other disasters, should be a primary objective.
- There is scope for enhanced understanding of why India has proven to be relatively immune from radicalisation. In addition, there is scope for the EU to engage with India on its learnings regarding the causes of radicalisation. In particular, online radicalisation is a growing challenge, and India's fast-growing number of smartphone users provides cause for concern; India has the third highest number of Internet users in the world. Similarly, there is scope for greater understanding and collaboration between the EU and Indian approach towards countering violent extremism.
- The EU and India should launch a dialogue to discuss approaches to rogue states, and terrorist groups and individuals. EU and India must develop a shared understanding and basis for identifying such 'states', the process and basis for sanctioning them and thereafter measuring the effectiveness of targeted sanctions.
- There is scope for greater functional cooperation: this could involve developing common situational awareness and identification of terrorist groups and coordinating measures aimed at preventing terror financing and the movement of terrorists. Furthermore there is at the minimum, potential for the exchange of best practices including those pertaining to deployment of new technology and tools.

Counter-terrorism and Radicalisation

Gareth Price

Counter-terrorism has been a subject for EU-India discussions and engagement since the strategic partnership was forged in 2004. Terrorism has afflicted both India and many countries in the EU for decades. India has suffered fall-out from the Sri Lankan civil war – including the assassination of then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 – and from left-wing extremism. Various leftist and separatist groups have been active in many European states. Recently, both EU members and India have suffered a number of attacks – both small- and large-scale – linked to Islamic extremists. Many attacks in India, including 2008 in Mumbai, have been conducted by terrorists from Pakistan. The willingness of attackers or bombers to die (in the case both of Islamist-inspired terrorists and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) adds a layer of complexity to the challenges faced by countries threatened by terrorism.

Three broad areas provide scope for counter-terrorism cooperation between the EU and India, some of which are already in progress:

- dealing with groups that both India and the EU agree are terrorist: for instance, restricting their movement and financing;
- sharing best practices in responding to or mitigating different types of terrorist attacks;
- understanding the causes of radicalisation in order to introduce successful counter-radicalisation strategies and limit the spread of extremism.

Most discussions on anti-terrorism cooperation focus on the first two themes. India and the EU have explored the scope for collaboration and introduced frameworks for cooperation. Although there are gaps – which exist presumably because of reluctance on either side for

dialogue on particularly sensitive issues – progress could almost certainly be expedited. In relation to dealing with terrorist groups, there is agreement on promoting joint efforts to disrupt recruitment, stem terrorist movements, tackle terrorist financing, and prevent the supply of arms. However, proposals to share intelligence have proved more difficult to implement.

With respect to responding to terrorist attacks, there is some degree of cooperation on cyber security and agreement to work together through pertinent international organisations on subjects such as aircraft security. There has also been an agreement for sharing experiences in responding to terrorist activities, which in light of attacks in Mumbai, Paris and Brussels—and of EU plans to assist in India's "Smart Cities" initiative—would seem to have great scope for sharing best practices in building resilience. However, sensitivities on the Indian side would appear to be responsible for the slow pace of engagement on issues such as CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) security. Some argue that similar concerns have limited cooperation on cyber security and intelligence sharing as well. It is noteworthy that since the recent attacks in Europe there has been growing interest both in Europe and in India to enhance engagement on issues that previously proved to be too sensitive.

The issue of Islamic radicalisation (hereon referred to as radicalisation) is a pertinent one. Understanding of radicalisation generally focuses on people who have been radicalised rather than those that have not. Yet India's 180 million Muslims have proved remarkably resilient to radicalisation, for reasons not satisfactorily explained. For instance, as of mid-2015, around 440 Belgian, 1,200 French and 500-600 German Muslims had joined the so-called Islamic State.[56] In contrast, by the end of 2015 the number of Indian Muslims in the group stood at just 25.[57]

Many of the major terrorist attacks committed in India over the past decades – the 1993 Mumbai Stock Exchange bombing; the 2001 attack on India's parliament and the 2008 Mumbai attacks – have each had a connection to Pakistan. If there is a desire for greater security cooperation between the EU and India, what is the scope for a more coordinated approach towards Pakistan? Are there instruments in the EU's toolbox which could help to deliver more satisfactory outcomes in countering extremism in Pakistan and encouraging Pakistan to draw back on its tolerance, if not active encouragement of anti-Indian militancy?

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56   Louisa Loveluck, "Islamic State: Where do its fighters come from?", The Telegraph, June 8, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11660487/Islamic-State-one-year-on-Where-do-its-fighters-come-from.html

57   Vijaita Singh, "25 Indians in Islamic State: govt.", The Hindu, December 27, 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/25-indians-in-islamic-state-govt/article8032071.ece

Radicalisation

Part of the difficulty in countering violent extremism is the lack of agreement and proper understanding of how people are radicalised to begin with, and therefore how best to counter it, beyond law enforcement. For instance, some countries have used non-violent extremists as tools for de-radicalisation or argue that the right to free speech is important to demonstrate so-called 'Western' or 'democratic' values. Others believe that non-violent extremists are part of the problem, providing the pool which produces violent extremists, or being a step on the pathway towards violent extremism.

While the specific factors driving extremism diverge between, and even within, countries, one fact is undeniable: that despite its Muslim population of some 180 million, Indian Muslims have proven largely immune to Islamic radicalisation. At the same time, while starting from a low base, the number of Indians being radicalised is increasing, with specific groups travelling overseas or moving within India.

While India has frequently undergone instances of communal violence, and Kashmir has suffered from separatist violence since 1989, until a series of bomb blasts in 2008 committed by the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), India was proud to claim that there were no instances of Indian Muslims committing acts of terrorism within India (Kashmir aside). There are very few documented cases of Indian Muslims joining the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s (in contrast to both Pakistan and Bangladesh). And over the past couple of years it is self-evident that India's Muslim population is vastly less likely to travel to the Islamic State (or undertake "lone wolf" activities) than Muslim minorities in Western Europe or North America. India has provided a much smaller number of recruits for Islamist groups than other countries in South Asia, West Asia (the Middle East), Europe or even countries such as Indonesia. While there are arguments against complacency – some radicalised Indian Muslims have participated in the Kashmir militancy – there are cases of groups of Indian Muslims leaving to join the Islamic State in Afghanistan and the Middle East, and more numerous cases of members of the Indian Diaspora becoming radicalised, notably from Maharashtra, Hyderabad and Kerala – India does appear to have found some means of deterring radicalisation among its Muslim community. The major attacks that have taken place in India (2008 aside) have clear links to (presumably radicalised) Muslims from Pakistan.

Consequently, India's approach resembles that of the West pre-2004: radicalisation is generally seen as a foreign, rather than a domestic, policy issue, and there is broad satisfaction with the assimilation of Muslims. Several explanations have been posited to explain why Indian Muslims have generally been immune from radicalisation:

Islamic radicalisation requires religious identity to be pre-eminent over other identities. But in India there are often more cultural similarities between Hindus and Muslims in

specific locations than differences, and there are more differences between Muslims hailing from different parts of the country. Historically, Hindu and Muslim ceremonies have been celebrated by members of both religions.

Along with this syncretic approach, Islam across South Asia has been dominated by Sufism, which differs from the more orthodox Arab versions of Islam. Consequently, India has been immune from the Shia-Sunni sectarianism that has afflicted Pakistan and countries in West Asia. Indian Muslims also appear to self-define against Wahhabi-influenced Muslims in Pakistan.

Other explanations suggest that India's democratic and secular traditions militate against radicalisation; that Islam as practised in India is generally moderate, despite many Indian Muslims being taught by the Deobandi school that influenced the Afghan Taliban; and that there is a tradition of religious intermingling. Even so, the 2006 Sachar Committee Report suggested that Muslims perform poorly by most social and economic indicators, and others have suggested that their moderation stems from the necessity of having more immediate problems.

Yet there are reasons to be less sanguine about the future. In a speech in Singapore in October 2016, Prime Minister Narendra Modi described radicalisation as one of the most significant threats to India, along with cross-border terrorism. The factors held responsible for creating the environment conducive to radicalisation in the West are apparent in India as well. The sense of victimhood stems less from personal experience of racism (as in the West) than from a sense of exclusion. Muslims are the poorest community, by religion, in India. Muslims are also under-represented in both the public and private sectors. In some cases, the driver of radicalisation may be less due to resentment on account of lack of employment than the idle time that stems from a lack of work. Furthermore the policy emphasis on issues such as cow slaughter – which underscore differences between Muslims and Hindus - has led some analysts to fear that this alienation could become more acute. And even if it does not, India may lose the opportunity to showcase its version of Islam "in juxtaposition to Saudi Arabia."[58]

The study of radicalisation is relatively new. The emergence of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the 1990s led to analysis of the distinction between "moderate" and "radical" Islam but this was generally seen through the prism of foreign policy. This approach intensified after 9/11. The Madrid train bombings and the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004, as well as the London attacks the following year, shifted the focus to understanding the factors for and means of radicalisation of people brought up in the West, and to understand radicalisation in other countries.

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58 Samar, "Radicalisation and the Indian Muslim", The Huffington Post, April 11, 2015 http://www. huffingtonpost.in/samar/radicalisation-and-the-indian-muslim/

Initial attempts focused on examining binary causes – whether economic, social, cultural or political. As the number of examples of radicalised individuals grew, however, it became quickly apparent that binary causes failed to explain this phenomenon. For instance, while poverty seemed an intuitive explanation for radicalisation, many of those committing acts of violence were not poor.

Subsequent analysis focussed on brainwashing. This approach assumed that a previously moderate individual would be "turned" by a radical cleric or someone else and would be persuaded to take violent action. Thus radicalisation was seen through the prism of religious ideas, highlighting the need to counter this "wrong" interpretation of Islam. But this gradual progression from "normal" to "radicalised" is now being challenged or nuanced on several levels. Instead a complex and often unique set of circumstances appear to be responsible in explaining why individuals turn to violent extremism.

The idea of "radicalisation" remains disputed on several levels. Some claim that it does not exist, arguing that it is a myth promoted by both the media and security agencies as a means of justifying more draconian policies. Others, such as Frank Furedi, argue that claims of radicalisation "make the alienation of young Muslims sound like a 'psychological virus', distracting attention from 'the very real cultural divisions that afflict British communities today.'"[59]

The second dispute relates to the issue of whether non-violent extremism – that is, those that hold extreme views but do not commit acts of violence – should be tackled or tolerated. In 2008, the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation noted:

> *While radicalism can pose a threat it is extremism, and particularly terrorism, that ought to be our main concern since it involves the active subversion of democratic values and the rule of law. In this sense violent radicalisation is to be understood as socialisation to extremism which manifests itself in terrorism.[60]*

However, many governments no longer take this view, and the balance of opinion appears to be shifting away from the toleration of extremist viewpoints towards the idea that the expression of extreme opinions provides a swamp in which violent extremists can flourish. Put another way, does extremism describe an individual that holds political ideas which are opposed to a country's core beliefs or which go against basic human rights? Or is extremism a question of the methods by which individuals seek to realise their aims?

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59   Peter Neumann, "The trouble with radicalization", International Affairs, Volume 89, Issue 4, July, 2013, p.873–893

60   European Commission, "Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism", A report of the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, May 2008 http://www.rikcoolsaet.be/files/art_ip_wz/Expert%20Group%20Report%20Violent%20Radicalisation%20FINAL.pdf

There is a growing consensus among analysts (if not always reflected in government response) that radicalisation is a process rather than a sudden event and that there is no single path or binary cause that can be used to predict "radicalisation". Instead there is a complex set of circumstances and individual pathways. (The exception to this rule is the case of peer-to-peer radicalisation in prisons which is a global phenomenon, discussed below.)

Four broad observations emerge from studies of radicalisation that explain why radicalisation takes place:

- Individuals feel an over-arching sense of the exclusion/oppression/alienation of Islamic people. This is often felt personally (because of discrimination in the West) and in general (focussed on issues such as Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya or the West's actions in Iraq);
- Context-specific explanations: Specific areas have particular attributes that help to explain why radicalisation takes place, for example, high incidence of poverty among the migrant community or strong influence from the far right. These reasons explain why some areas have generated more radicalised individuals than others;[61]
- Personal experience of violence: The idea of a pathway from moderate to extreme to violent Islam may be misleading. In many cases, radicalised individuals have been exposed to violence before adopting an extreme version of Islam. They take the violence from their past experience with them;
- Friendship groups: Radical Islam is the current anti-establishment ideology as Marxism in the West was in the 1970s. Many young people express anti-establishment sentiments, although most grow out of it. There is evidence that when particular groups of friends decide to adopt a violent approach, mapping these linkages and networks offers the best means of identifying those likely to turn to violence. Feeding into this approach is the breakdown of traditional social structures in immigrant communities.

There is scope for enhanced understanding of why India has proven to be relatively immune from domestic radicalisation. In addition, there is scope for the EU to engage with India on its learnings regarding the causes of radicalisation. In particular, online radicalisation is a growing challenge, which is another potential area for EU-India cooperation.

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61   Arturo Varvelli (ed.), "Jihadist Hotbeds: Understanding Local Radicalization Processes", Milan: The Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 2016 http://www.ispionline.it/it/EBook/Rapporto_ Hotbeds_2016/JIHADIST.HOTBEDS_EBOOK.pdf. (This ebook notes the specific context in areas including Minneapolis and St Paul in the US; Brussels-Antwerp in Belgium and the western Balkans, which explain the disproportionate number of radicalised individuals.)

Pakistan

Perhaps the most contentious subject for potential EU-India cooperation is the policy approach towards Pakistan, and the extent to which it could be coordinated. A dialogue in relation to Pakistan risks raising Indian claims that the EU is "hyphenating" India and Pakistan. Yet given Indian claims that terrorism in India generally is connected to – or even directed by – Pakistan, ignoring Pakistan in relation to counter-terrorism would seem counter-intuitive.

For Pakistan, Kashmir lies at the heart of the relationship between India and Pakistan, while India argues that terrorism – some state-sponsored – is the primary source of tension. As regards Kashmir, there is an argument that Pakistan – or at least Pakistan's military – does not want the issue to be resolved so that it can maintain its status within Pakistan. While civil society in Pakistan is increasingly squeezed and political parties have ceded control of large parts of policy-making to the military, both the EU and India have an interest in entrenching civilian rather than military power in Pakistan. Yet thus far no one has devised a strategy to dislodge Pakistan's military from controlling key aspects of its foreign policy.

The EU, along with the US and other members of the UN Security Council, hope for dialogue between India and Pakistan and for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. India's long-standing position is that it is open for dialogue with Pakistan but that by turning a blind eye/facilitating/actively encouraging terrorist attacks within India, Pakistan demonstrates its disinterest in dispute resolution.

Western (i.e., European and US) policy towards Pakistan has been driven by the need to engage Pakistan so as to elicit the best outcomes in Afghanistan. But engaging Pakistan through an Af-Pak prism may not provide the best approach to understand Pakistan's decision-making process or rationale. Furthermore, while foreign troops have not entirely withdrawn from Afghanistan, it is self-evident that the EU and US policy towards Pakistan has not succeeded in eliciting the best outcome.

Given the desire of both the EU and US to deepen ties with India, does this present an opportunity to recalibrate relations with Pakistan? Further, given that preventing conflict between India and Pakistan is a priority for the EU (and the US), would it be helpful to cut ties with Pakistan (in whatever way) and alienate it? Would a Pakistan that is more reliant on China be a greater or lesser threat to India?

The EU's response will be vital in determining whether or not Indian efforts to isolate Pakistan succeed not least since it is Pakistan's largest trading partner. Proposed action at the UN against certain individuals such as Masood Azhar, head of Jaish-e-Mohammed, has failed because of China's veto power. It is most likely that China will continue to support

Pakistan although it may well have been irked by the latter's failure to successfully encourage the Afghan Taliban to engage in a political dialogue with the Afghan government. Furthermore, a recent article in a state-run Chinese newspaper highlighted security concerns in relation to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and implied that the project may be scaled back with more attention being given to Southeast Asia. Security issues in Baluchistan are also of concern to China. Clearly, if there were a change in China's position the opportunity for sanctions under the auspices of the UN would arise.

In the (more likely) absence of UN sanctions, it is possible that India would look for support from the EU and the US, as well as the Gulf. In May the Punjab (Pakistani province) Law Minister Rana Sanaullah Khan was asked by BBC-Urdu why Pakistan did not take legal action against groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad. He replied, "How can you prosecute a group with whom the state itself has been involved with?"[62] These comments, which appeared to admit a link between the Pakistani state and some militant groups, led to speculation that the EU could impose landing restrictions on Pakistani airlines. Another possibility would be for the EU to retract trade concessions that were introduced following the 2010 Pakistan floods. Alternatively, an array of sanctions against individuals and groups or targeted economic sanctions could be introduced.

Furthermore, India's decision to draw attention to human rights abuses in Baluchistan opens up another question for the EU. There has long been speculation that the EU could remove its GSP+ trade preferences to Pakistan on the grounds that the latter is not meeting the terms of the various human rights conventions on which the tariff preferences are contingent. The greater the publicity given to Baluchistan, the greater would be the chances of the preferences being removed.

Given Indian concerns that discussing Pakistan suggests a re-hyphenation of India and Pakistan, one approach could be for the EU and India to discuss approaches to rogue states, terrorist groups and individuals. While India has traditionally been hostile towards the imposition of sanctions, there may be scope for a broader discussion, in particular on the effectiveness of targeted sanctions.

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62 Pakistan Today, "Rana Sanaullah rules out action against JeM, JuD due to state involvement", Pakistan Today, May 18, 2016, http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/05/18/national/rana-sanaullah-rules-out-action-against-jem-jud-due-to-state-involvement/

EU-India declarations on counter-terrorism

September 2005: Political Declaration on the India-EU Strategic Partnership

We recognize the fact that terrorism constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, and reaffirm our condemnation of all acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations as criminal and unjustifiable, irrespective of their motives. As part of our joint efforts to fight terrorism, we will establish contacts between the Indian and EU Counter Terrorism Coordinators, work towards blocking access to terrorist financing and co-operate in the fight against money laundering.

Source: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/86132.pdf

December 2010: EU-India Joint Declaration on International Terrorism

Political dialogue:
• Continue to discuss Counter Terrorism cooperation at high level meetings within our security dialogue.
• Encourage all countries to deny safe haven to terrorists and to dismantle terror infrastructure on the territories under their control.

Law enforcement and police cooperation:
• Identify, including through seminars, areas of cooperation with respect to the designated agencies, according to their respective competencies.
• Continue efforts to prevent access by terrorists to financial and other resources.
• Enhance efforts for accessing and sharing strategic information, so as to better disrupt

and prevent terrorist activity.

- Intensify efforts to render the widest possible measure of mutual legal assistance and to expedite processing of extradition requests and to explore the possibility of an EU-India Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement and an EU-India Agreement on Extradition.

Research, Technology and Cybersecurity:
- Agree to closer India-EU cooperation and mutual assistance in this area.

Transport, aviation and border security:
- Work together in ICAO, to improve international security standards for passengers, cargo and mail, including in transit.
- Coordinate efforts against terrorists and terrorist groups so as to deny them safe haven and freedom of travel in accordance with international law.
- Encourage more efficient controls on issuance of identity and travel documents to prevent movement of terrorist and terrorist groups across national borders.

Consequence Management:
- Share experiences and best practices on managing the consequences of a terrorist attack.

Cooperation in the Multilateral system, including United Nations:
- Increase cooperation in multilateral fora like the UN, and intensify efforts to bring about a rapid adoption of CCIT.
- Build on the opportunities of coordination provided by the membership of Financial Action Task Force of EU Member States and India by intensifying efforts to prevent access by terrorists to financial and other resources and by sharing best practices on financial controls.
- Reaffirm commitment to implement the 2006 UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy as a unique instrument to enhance national, regional and global efforts to counter terrorism.
- Encourage global ratification and effective implementation of all relevant conventions on counter terrorism.
- Promote initiatives, under the auspices of UN, inter alia, on Alliance of Civilization initiative, to enhance dialogue and broaden understanding among civilizations.
- The EU and India agree that an effective and comprehensive approach to diminish the long term threat of violent extremism is an important component of our efforts to combat terrorism.

Source: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/118405.pdf

30 March 2016: India-EU Joint Declaration on the Fight Against Terrorism

Recalling the 'India-EU Joint Declaration on International Terrorism' of 2010, the Leaders noted the urgent need for a comprehensive approach to address terrorism. They resolved to step up cooperation to prevent and counter violent extremism and radicalisation, disrupt recruitment, terrorist movements and the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, stop sources of terrorist financing, dismantle terrorist infrastructure and prevent supply of arms to terrorists. To this end, they committed to further enhance exchanges in the fields of finance, justice and police and looked forward to the EU-India Counter-terrorism Dialogue.

Reaffirming that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group, India and the EU agreed to coordinate efforts to prevent violent extremism also by addressing conditions conducive to its spread. The Leaders expressed concern at the increased incidence of radicalisation of youth and the use of the internet to this end. They emphasised the need to develop bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the field of information and communication technology, including IT service providers to minimise the use of cyber space for by terrorist groups and to counter extremist narratives online. They agreed that cooperation between immigration and airline authorities for monitoring travel of foreign terrorist fighters requires urgent collective action by all nations.

Source: http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26576/IndiaEU_Joint_Statement_on_the_13th_IndiaEU_Summit_Brussels

Biographies

Dr. Samir Saran

Samir Saran is Vice President of the Observer Research Foundation. Samir spearheads ORF's outreach and business development activities. He is a frequent commentator on issues of Global Governance, including climate change and energy policy, global development, architecture, cyber security and internet governance, and India's foreign policy. Apart from his academic publications, Samir features regularly in Indian and international print and broadcast media. His latest published work includes, "India's Contemporary Plurilateralism" in the Oxford University Press Handbook on India's Foreign Policy; "New Room to Manoeuvre: An Indian Approach to Climate Change", a Global Policy–ORF publication; "Attitudes to Water in South Asia," a joint ORF–Chatham House Report; "A Long Term Vision for BRICS," a comprehensive vision document submitted to the BRICS Think Tanks Council; "The ITU and Unbundling Internet Governance: An Indian Perspective," for the Council on Foreign Relations; a joint research project between ORF and the Heritage Foundation, "Indo–US Cooperation on Internet Governance and Cyber Security;" and a paper on "The Shifting Digital Pivot: Time for Smart Multilateralism" for Digital Debates. He is the Indian Chair for the Civil BRICS Initiative, and also chairs CyFy, the India conference on cyber security and internet governance.

Ms. Kanchi Gupta

Kanchi Gupta is an Associate Fellow with the West Asia Regional Studies Initiative at ORF, New Delhi. Her research focuses on India's West Asia policy, and the political and security dynamics in the region through the prism of extra-regional stakeholders. Kanchi holds a Master's degree in International Studies and Diplomacy from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. She also has a Master's degree in International Politics from the University of Bath. Her articles have been published in Foreign Policy, Haaretz, The Jerusalem Post and The Diplomat.

Dr. Eva Pejsova

Eva Pejsova is a Senior Analyst at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), focusing on East Asia, EU-Asia relations and maritime security. She holds a PhD in Strategic Studies from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore, and has previously worked with the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the French Prime Minister's Office, the OECD and the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF). At the EUISS, Eva manages regular think-tank dialogues with the EU's strategic partners in Asiaand coordinates the EU member committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP EU). Her research focusesmostly on maritime security in East Asia, regional cooperative mechanisms, sovereignty disputes, preventive diplomacy, as well as questions of good ocean governance and environmental security.

Mr. John-Joseph Wilkins

John-Joseph Wilkins is the Public Information Officer at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). At the EUISS, he works primarily on outreach activities and publications, and also contributes to the work of the Institute on EU-India relations. Prior to his roles at the EUISS, John-Joseph worked in the political section of the EU Delegation to India and Bhutan. He holds an MSc in European Studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

Dr. Gareth Price

Gareth Price is a Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House leading research on South Asia since 2004. He previously worked as an analyst at the Economist Intelligence Unit focussing on South Asia, in particular India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and before that the South Asia analyst at Control Risks Group. His current research interests include India's foreign policy, regional relations within South Asia, in particular Afghanistan and its neighbours, and the politics of water in the region. His PhD examined the causes of ethnic conflicts in north east India.